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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Third Judicial District Court denied Appellants1
Motions for Summary Judgment on March 30, 1992 and this Court
granted Appellants' Joint Petition for Permission to Appeal
the Interlocutory Order on June 23, 1992. This Appeal is
properly before the Court pursuant to Utah Constitution,
Article VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(g) and (j)
(Supp. 1992).

II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Whether this Court properly determined in

Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989),
that the damage limitation contained in the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act (the "Act") was unconstitutional under the Utah
Constitution as applied to the University Hospital.
2.

Whether the 1987 Amendment to the Act (the

"1987 Amendment"), which purported to define any activity
undertaken by any governmental entity as a governmental
function, removed the constitutional infirmities of the
previous version of the Act and validated the Act's damage
limitation.

2

III.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Utah Constitution, Article I, §§ 7, 10, 11 and 24 and
Utah Constitution, Article V, § 1, attached hereto at Appendix
"A11.
Sections 63-30-2, 63-30-3 and 63-30-34 of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et seq.
as they existed in January of 1989, attached hereto at
Appendix "B".

IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings

Below.

Appellee Shelly Hipwell ("Mrs. Hipwell") suffered
catastrophic and permanent brain damage when her heart was
punctured by a Resident at the University of Utah Hospital
while improperly performing a bone marrow biopsy in December,
1988.

Appellants were then retained to pursue recovery on

behalf of Mrs. Hipwell against all the health care providers
who treated her, including the McKay-Dee Hospital and the
University Hospital.

3

In May, 1989, shortly after Appellants were retained
to represent Mrs. Hipwell, without even filing a lawsuit or
conducting any meaningful investigation, and with the
understanding and specific acknowledgement that this Court in
Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989),
had struck down the $250,000.00 statutory damage cap
theretofore in effect for the University Hospital, Appellants
agreed to settle Mrs. Hipwell's catastrophic injuries for a
meager $250,000.00 from the University Hospital.

Appellants

obtained court approval for this settlement through admitted
misrepresentations to the probate court concerning the extent
of their investigation of Mrs. Hipwell's condition and the
underlying facts.

Further, Appellants negligently failed to

investigate and pursue any recovery against McKay-Dee
Hospital.

Appellants also negligently failed to cause the

proceeds from the settlement with the University Hospital to
be paid into a trust, resulting in the Social Security
Administration receiving all of the settlement payments being
made for Mrs. Hipwell's care.
Shortly after this lawsuit was filed on behalf of Mrs.
Hipwell, Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
seeking dismissal of the Complaint on the basis that the
Resident at the University Hospital who punctured and
lacerated Mrs. Hipwellfs heart was an employee of the
University of Utah School of Medicine, not the University
Hospital.

Appellants contended that the University Hospital
4

was therefore not liable for Mrs. Hipwell's injuries and that
the $250,000.00 settlement was reasonable as a matter of law
because this Courtfs decision in Condemarin only applied to
the University Hospital.

Appellants acknowledged that the

damage limits were unconstitutional.

When Mrs. Hipwell

demonstrated in her Reply Memorandum that the argument was
without foundation, Appellants jettisoned that theory and then
filed what they acknowledged was in effect a new summary
judgment motion.
In the new Motion for Summary Judgment, the principal
argument raised by Appellants was that the Utah legislature's
1991 Amendment of § 63-30-3(2) (purporting to define certain
limited activities of the University Hospital, including the
treatment of high risk patients transferred from other
hospitals, as a governmental function) and the legislature's
enactment in 1991 of a new damage limitation in Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-34 (limiting recovery for negligence arising out of
any treatment by the University Hospital to $250,000.00),
should be retroactively applied to Mrs. Hipwell's claim, thus
rendering the $250,000.00 settlement reasonable as a matter of
law.

In passing, Appellants also asserted that the

legislature's 1987 Amendment to § 63-30-2 of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act defining any act or failure to act
of any governmental entity as a "governmental function" cured
the constitutional problems identified by this Court in
Condemarin, thus rendering the $250,000.00 damage limitation
5

constitutional and the settlement reasonable as a matter of
law.
When Mrs. Hipwell then demonstrated that Appellants1
retroactivity arguments were groundless, Appellants regrouped,
abandoned their retroactivity argument and filed yet another
memorandum, placing all their emphasis on the arguments that
Condemarin was wrongly decided because the state was
absolutely immune from suit at common law and the 1987
Amendment, which simply relabeled everything that a
governmental entity did as "governmental," somehow avoided the
constitutional infirmities with the damage limitation which
this Court struck down in Condemarin.

The District Court

properly rejected those arguments and denied Appellants1
Motion for Summary Judgment, finding the damage limitation
unconstitutional.

B.

Statement of Facts.

1.

On December 13, 1988, 26-year-old Shelly Hipwell

was admitted as a patient to McKay-Dee Medical Center in
Ogden, Utah suffering complications in connection with her
pregnancy.
2.

[R. 309].
Mrs. Hipwell was treated at McKay-Dee by Dr.

Michael J. Healy ("Dr. Healy"), her obstetrician.
3.

[R. 310].

Incident to the birth of her second child through

cesarean section at McKay-Dee on December 13, 1988, Mrs.
6

Hipwell suffered from, inter alia. HELLP syndrome, Adult
Respiratory Distress Syndrome, a severe infection of unknown
origin and, as part thereof, suffered a ruptured liver and
consequential severe infection.

At the time, Mrs. Hipwell was

in a condition of hemorrhagic shock.
4.

[R. 310].

At the instructions of McKay-Dee Hospital, Mrs.

Hipwell was transferred to the University Hospital as a
patient on December 23, 1988.

[R. 310]. At the time of

transfer, the limitation on damages applied to the University
Hospital, but not the McKay-Dee Hospital.
5.

At the time Mrs. Hipwell was admitted, it was

intended that she be a patient of the University of Utah
Hospital and under the care of persons under the control and
responsibility of the University Hospital.
6.

[R. 310-311].

Dr. John R. Weis ("Dr. Weis") was a resident

physician who apparently regularly performed medical services
for patients at the University Hospital.
7.

On January 18, 1989, during an attempted bone

marrow biopsy on Mrs. Hipwell's sternum, Dr. Weis punctured
and lacerated Mrs. Hipwell's heart, resulting in severe brain
damage, rendering Mrs. Hipwell totally and permanently
disabled and later resulting in her death on May 27, 1992. [R.
311].

Plaintiff believes that Dr. Weis had never performed

such a biopsy and was not supervised in any manner by the
University Hospital.

[R. 311].
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8.

On February 10, 1989, Appellants Healy and Sharp

were retained by Mrs. Hipwell^ family to represent her in a
medical malpractice action.
9.

[R. 311].

On April 13, 1989, Mrs. Hipwell was transferred

back to McKay-Dee from the University Hospital.
10.

[R. 312].

In April, 1989, Sharp and Healy received an offer

from the University Hospital to settle Mrs. Hipwell1s case for
$250,000.00, the maximum amount that could then be obtained
from the University under the statutory cap.
11.

[R. 312].

On May 1, 1989, the Utah Supreme Court issued its

decision in Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348
(Utah 1989), holding the statutory cap unconstitutional at
least as to the University Hospital.
12.

[R. 312].

On May 6, 1989, with knowledge that this Court

had ruled the statutory cap unconstitutional, Sharp and Healy
agreed to settle Mrs. Hipwellfs case for the sum of
$250,000.00, subject to approval of the Utah probate court.
No counteroffer whatsoever was made by Sharp and Healy to the
Universityfs original offer, notwithstanding that this Court
had struck down the statutory cap.
filed on Mrs. Hipwell!s behalf.
13.

No litigation was even

[R. 312].

On May 15, 1989, the Utah probate court approved

Mrs. Hipwellfs settlement based solely on representations made
by Sharp to the court.
14.

[R. 312].

A few days after being retained to represent Mrs.

Hipwell, Sharp was advised by co-counsel Healy that Healy's
8

brother, Dr. Healy, who was Mrs. Hipwell's attending physician
at McKay-Dee Hospital, felt that medical malpractice in Mrs.
Hipwell's case was very clear and that the case should not
involve the need for litigation and should result in a
sizeable settlement.
15.

[R. 314].

Sharp admitted that the effective evaluation of a

medical negligence claim involves securing all relevant
medical records, including X-rays and CT studies as well as
all historical evidence pertaining to the potential client and
conducting interviews regarding the circumstances of the case.
[R. 314].
16.

Sharp and Healy did not obtain a complete set of

medical records from Mrs. Hipwell's first period of time of
McKay-Dee on 12-13-88 to 12-23-88. This was the period of
time that she was under the care of Dr. Healy, brother of
Healy.

[R. 314].
17.

Sharp and Healy did not obtain a complete set of

medical records from the University Hospital for the period of
time (12-23-88 to 4-13-89), during which Mrs. Hipwell's heart
was lacerated during the attempted sternal bone marrow biopsy.
[R. 314-315].
18.

Sharp and Healy did not obtain any records from

McKay-Dee during Mrs. Hipwell's second stay there, which
commenced on April 13, 1989 and continued through the time
that Mrs. Hipwell's case was settled.
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[R. 315].

19.

Sharp and Healy did not speak with any medical

witnesses who were involved in Mrs. Hipwell's care at the time
her heart was lacerated.
20.

[R. 315].

Sharp and Healy received their information

regarding how their client was injured solely from the
attorney for the University Hospital.
investigation was conducted.
21.

No independent

[R. 315].

Sharp and Healy never spoke with Dr. Weis, the

resident who lacerated Mrs. Hipwell's heart during the sternal
bone marrow biopsy.
22.

[R. 315].

Sharp and Healy do not know how Dr. Weis managed

to puncture their client's heart.
23.

[R. 316].

Sharp and Healy did not obtain any independent

medical opinion regarding whether Dr. Weis or anyone else was
negligent with regard to the heart laceration that occurred
during the bone marrow biopsy on Mrs. Hipwell.
24.

[R. 317].

Sharp and Healy did not interview any witnesses,

including the two residents directly in charge of Mrs.
Hipwell's care at the time of the malpractice at the
University Hospital.

Those residents, Kerry Paape and Edward

Raines, were and are of the opinion that the bone marrow
aspiration was done in a negligent manner.
25.
Hipwell.

[R. 317].

In point of fact, Sharp and Healy never saw Mrs.

[R. 318].
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26.

Although Sharp never met Mrs. Hipwell [Sharp

Depo., p. 15], Sharp was aware that Mrs. Hipwell was in a coma
and was "pain sensitive only."
27.

[R. 327].

Sharp has handled a number of catastrophic injury

cases, but has never had a client more catastrophically
injured than Mrs. Hipwell.

Mrs. Hipwell was as badly injured

as any client that Sharp has ever had.
28.

[R. 327].

Sharp has seen other catastrophic brain injury

cases in which future care was projected into the five to ten
million dollar range
29.

[R. 329].

Sharp did not consult with any damage expert who

could have evaluated the future potential cost of Mrs.
Hipwell's care.
30.

[R. 329].

Sharp never performed any calculation or

conducted any estimate of what Mrs. Hipwell's loss of wages
were up to the time of settlement.
31.

[R. 330].

Sharp never conducted any investigation or made

any estimate of Mrs. Hipwell's loss of earning capacity.

[R.

330] .
32.

Sharp never had any contract with any

rehabilitative health care provider that could give him any
information about long term care, needs or costs.
33.

[R. 330].

Sharp recognized at the time that he settled Mrs.

Hipwell's case that, under the terms of the settlement, Mrs.
Hipwell would be netting less than her medical bills incurred
up to that point.

[R. 330].
11

34.

Sharp received a fee for his services in handling

the Hipwell case of $34,500.00.
35.

[R. 330].

Sharp advised the probate court:

M

. . . I have carefully gone through all the
medical records from McKay-Dee Hospital until the
time she was ultimately transferred to the
University of Utah Hospital . . . "
Sharp admits that this was not true.
36.

[R. 330].

Sharp and Healy did not present the probate court

with any affidavits from anyone regarding any aspect of Mrs.
Hipwellfs case.

The probate court made its decision approving

the Hipwell settlement solely upon what it was told by Sharp.
The court had no independent means of determining whether what
Sharp was telling it was accurate or complete.
37.

[R. 330-331].

No independent guardian ad litem was selected to

give an independent evaluation to the probate court.

[R.

331].
38.

With regard to the impact of the Condemarin

decision on the Hipwell case, Sharp advised the probate court:
"The current status of the law is there is no
longer a cap against the University Medical
Center. They're treated as all health care
provider institutions in the state, and there is
no caps.,f
[R. 331].
39.

Mrs. Hipwell died on May 27, 1992.

[R. 728]. Up

to the time of her death, Social Security took all of the
settlement annuity payments from the family in exchange for
providing Social Security benefits.
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V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

This Court correctly decided in Condemarin that

the governmental/proprietary distinction applied to the state
at common law and that the damage limitation violated the open
courts provision of the Utah Constitution by restricting the
right to sue the state for damages for injuries suffered at a
state-owned hospital.

Although the courts did not have

occasion to apply that distinction to the state at common law
prior to the adoption of the Utah Constitution because the
role of the state had not expanded to the point that the state
was performing proprietary functions, no Utah case has ever
held that the distinction was not applicable to the state at
common law.

Although there is a split of authority in other

states about whether the distinction applies at common law,
there is no reasoned basis for treating the state differently
from other governmental entities with respect to the
governmental/ proprietary distinction.

The correct analysis

should focus on what activities of any governmental entity
were considered proprietary at the time the Utah Constitution
was adopted and were thus not protected by governmental
immunity.

This is the analysis that Condemarin utilized in

deciding the open courts issue.

Thus, the legislature's

substantial restriction of this right by passing the damage

13

limitation violated the open courts provision contained in
Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution.
2.

If the damage limitation were otherwise upheld,

that limitation would violate the open courts provision
because the Utah Governmental Immunity Act immunized all
individual health care providers, including individuals, from
liability for their negligence without providing a reasonable
substitute remedy.

The substitution of the right to sue the

state for up to $250,000.00 is not a reasonable substitute
remedy for the right to sue health care providers for
unlimited damages.
3.

The damage limitation violates due process and

equal protection for the reasons stated by this Court in
Condemarin.

Even if it is assumed for argument that the

damage limitation does not violate the open courts provision
of the Utah Constitution, the Condemarin Court correctly
utilized a heightened scrutiny standard in determining the
constitutionality of the damage limitation on the basis that
the damage limitation severely restricted important
substantive rights of individuals to recover for personal
injuries, which is a substantial property right.

At the time

the damage limitation was enacted by the legislature, the
citizens of this state had a right to full recovery for
injuries inflicted at a state-owned hospital.
limitation drastically restricted that right.

14

The damage

4.

Even if the court were to employ a rational basis

standard in judging the constitutionality of the damage
1imitation, that limitation is unconstitutional as a violation
of equal protection and due process.

The only justification

offered for the damage limitation either on the floor of the
legislature or by Appellants, is the fiscal protection of the
state treasury and the University Hospital.

However, as in

Condemarin, there has been absolutely no factual showing,
either in the legislative history or before the District
Court, that the recovery limitation is reasonably necessary
for the preservation of the public treasury, that it is
urgently and overwhelmingly necessary, that the amount of the
limitation has any reasonable basis, or that a much less
drastic alternative was not available.
made.

No such showing can be

At the very least, issues of fact exist in this regard.
5.

The 1987 Amendment to the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act did not cure the constitutional problems with the
damage limitation.

Condemarin did not strike down the damage

limitation only because the operation of a state-owned
hospital had not been labeled by the legislature as a
governmental function.

Rather, other classifications in the

statute rendered the limitation unconstitutional.

Moreover,

the legislature cannot arbitrarily define everything that any
governmental entity does to be a governmental function and
thereby immunize proprietary activities.

The standard for

determining what is a governmental function is whether the
15

activity under consideration is of such a unique nature that
it can only be performed by a governmental agency or is
essential to the core of governmental activity.

This Court

observed in Condemarin that the operation of the University
Hospital is not a governmental function in the constitutional
sense and that the legislature by enacting the statute cannot
resolve the constitutional issue as to what is and is not a
governmental function.
In fact, it is clear that the legislature itself did
not believe that the 1987 Amendment validated the statutory
damage cap after Condemarin.

When the legislature enacted the

1991 Amendment it believed that Condemarin had invalidated the
expansion of governmental immunity contained in the 1987
Amendment and the legislature then purported to define cetrtain
limited activities of the University Hospital as governmental
functions because they were "unique or essential to the core
of governmental activity."

In 1991, the legislature also

enacted a new damage limitation.
Finally, when Appellants settled Mrs. Hipwellfs
injures they did so in the belief that the damage limitation
had been invalidated; they did not believe that the 1987
Amendment had validated the limitation.

16

VI.
ARGUMENT

Appellants erroneously argue that this Court was wrong
in holding in Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348
(Utah 1989), that the damage limitation contained in Utah Code
Annotated §63-30-34 violated the open courts provision
contained in Article I § 11 of the Utah Constitution.
Appellants assert this Court fell into this supposed error
because the Court mistakenly believed that under the common
law, at the time the Utah Constitution was enacted,
proprietary functions of the State of Utah were not immune
when in fact, so the argument goes, the state was absolutely
immune from liability no matter what kind of activity it
entered into.

Appellants conclude that the damage limitation

therefore did not restrict any right in existence at that time
and the open courts provision of the constitution was not
violated.
Proceeding from this faulty premise, Appellants argue
that because the open courts provision was not violated, this
Court erroneously applied a heightened scrutiny standard to
its analysis of the due process and equal protection issues
raised by the damage limitation and, if a reasonable basis
standard had been utilized, no violation of the due process or
equal protection clauses would have been found.

Finally,

Appellants incredibly contend that the 1987 Amendment in any
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event eliminated any constitutional concerns over the damage
limitation by simply defining any activity of any governmental
entity as a "governmental function."
For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is
respectfully submitted that these arguments are wrong and that
they spring from a fundamental misinterpretation of this
Court's decision in Condemarin, other applicable case law and
the history of governmental immunity in Utah.

Condemarin was

correctly decided by this Court and renders the damage
limitation in this case unconstitutional on its face.

A.

THE DAMAGE LIMITATION VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS

PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

1.

The Governmental/Proprietary Distinction Applies

to All Governmental Entities.

Appellants' argument that all activities of the state
were immune at common law and that the governmental/
proprietary distinction only applied to municipalities is
without merit.
It is true, as Appellants argue, that prior to the
adoption of the Utah Constitution the application of the
governmental/proprietary distinction had only been occasioned
in the context of cases involving municipalities.

That does

not mean, however, that the distinction was only applicable to
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municipalities, and no Utah case has so held.

The plain fact

of the matter is that prior to the adoption of the Utah
Constitution almost 100 years ago, the state only performed
governmental functions.

The role of the state had not yet

expanded so that it was performing proprietary functions as
were municipalities at the time.

Appellants have not and

cannot point to any state activity at common law when the Utah
Constitution was adopted that was even remotely proprietary in
nature.

Because of this fact, no case arose giving the courts

occasion to discuss the governmental/proprietary distinction
in cases involving state activities prior to the adoption of
the Constitution.
Appellants have not cited one Utah case holding that
the governmental/proprietary distinction did not apply to the
state at common law and Mrs. Hipwell's counsel has been unable
to find any such case.

In this regard, Appellants1 reliance

on Bingham v. Board of Education of Oaden City, 223 P.2d 432
(Utah 1950), to support the proposition that the governmental/
proprietary distinction was not applicable to the state is
misplaced.

In fact, Bingham appears to support just the

opposite view.

Bingham involved a claim for personal injuries

against the Board of Education of Ogden City, which is an
agency of the State of Utah.

In holding that the school board

was immune, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that, in
contrast to a municipality, the school board discharged purely
governmental functions.

The Court stated:
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This distinction is better understood when
consideration is given to the fact that school
boards are created exclusively for school
purposes and are mere agencies of the state
established for the sole purpose of administering
a system of public education for which they
receive no private or corporate benefit; and
that, as to tort liability, such agencies or
authorities occupy a status different from that
of municipal corporations which ordinarily have a
dual character and which may exercise proprietary
as well as governmental functions.
[223 P.2d at 435].

[Emphasis added].

The Bingham court went on to observe:
The reasons given by most courts in holding
boards of education immune from liability for
negligence center around the proposition that
school boards act in connection with public
education as agents or instrumentalities of the
state, in the performance of a governmental
function, and consequently they partake of the
state's sovereignty with respect to tort
liability.
[223 P.2d at 436].

[Emphasis added].

Bingham implies that if a state agency were performing
proprietary functions rather than governmental functions that
such activities would not be immune.

Similarly, in Campbell

Bldg. Co. v. State Road Commission, 70 P.2d 857, 860 (Utcth
1937), decided long before the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
was enacted, the Court seemed to imply its recognition of the
distinction at common law.
Moreover, the Utah legislature in passing the Act in
1965 implicitly recognized the state was already liable for
its proprietary activities.

The legislature first provided in

the Act for immunity with respect to governmental functions
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and then waived that immunity with respect to certain
governmental functions.

If the state was not already liable

with respect to proprietary functions, the original Act
contained a serious omission because the Act only waived
immunity with respect to certain governmental functions; the
Act did not waive the immunity which Appellants would have
this Court believe existed with respect to proprietary
functions.
Other states have recognized that the governmental/
proprietary distinction applies to the state.

For example, in

Herschel v. University Hospital Foundation, 610 P.2d 237
(Okla. 1980), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
governmental/proprietary distinction was applicable to the
state at common law.

There the trial court ruled that the

University Hospital was protected from liability for the death
of a patient under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

The

state argued that the governmental/proprietary distinction
applicable to municipalities was not applicable to the state.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected this contention,
determined that the operation of the hospital was a
proprietary function and that the state was therefore not
protected under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, observing:
The fundamental distinction as described in
the dissent was attributed to James v. Trustees
of Wellston Township . . . wherein the Court
noted counties are but subdivisions of the state
and a suit against the county is in effect a suit
against the state, whereas cities are municipal
corporations, voluntarily formed, and the
sovereign immunity of the state in no way extends
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to such corporations. Having resolved to apply
the more than traditional protection of Article
II, Section 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution,
declaring a remedy for every wrong, to those
factual instances where a tort is committed by a
county, we now are constrained by the same
analysis to find the state is similarly liable
for injury occasioned by torts committed by the
state arising from proprietary functions. Not to
do so would deny a remedy to an Oklahoma citizen
injured by the parent governmental authority and
at the same time impose liability on governmental
subdivisions of the state and municipal
corporations for similar acts, thus imposing
liability on all governmental entities save the
largest, that being the sovereign.
[610 P.2d at 241].
See also Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Wainscott. 19 P. 328
(Ariz. 1933); Union Trust Co. v. State of California, 99 P.
183 (Cal. 1909); Henrv v. Okla. Turnpike Authority, 478 P.2d
898, 901 (Okla. 1970); McCoy v. Kenosha County, 218 N.W. 348
(Wis. 1928) (recognizing the governmental/proprietary
distinction applies to the state itself and its accredited
agents —

counties, cities, villages, towns, school districts,

etc.); Bakken v. State, 219 N.W. 834 (N.D. 1928) (rejecting
argument that damages could not be recovered for personal
injuries against the state of North Dakota, doing business as
the North Dakota Mill & Elevator Association, for its
negligent operation of a mill).
As early as 1824, Chief Justice Marshall observed in
Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia, 24 U.S.
904 (1824):
It is, we think, a sound principle, that
when a government becomes a partner in any
trading company, it divests itself, so far as
concerns the transactions of that company, of its
sovereign character, and takes that of a private
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citizen. Instead of communicating to the company
its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends
to a level with those with whom it associates
itself, and takes the character which belongs to
its associates, and to the business which is to
be transacted.
[Id. at 907].
Appellants cite cases from a few other states for the
proposition that the governmental/proprietary distinction at
common law did not apply to the state.

Although these cases

do contain such language, for the most part the statements in
this regard are dicta.

More importantly, it appears that

these courts have been led to this conclusion merely because
in earlier times the state only performed governmental
functions and therefore there was no occasion to apply the
distinction to the state.

See, e.g., Green v. Commonwealth.

435 N.E.2d 362, 365 (Mass. App. 1982).

In any event, the

cases cited by Appellants offer precious little rationale for
not applying the governmental/proprietary distinction to the
state and these cases should not be followed by this Court.
It makes little sense in analyzing the immunity issue
to differentiate based upon what governmental entity is
involved.

A proper analysis of this issue requires a

determination of what activities performed by any governmental
entity were immune at common law 100 years ago when the Utah
Constitution was adopted.

This is precisely the analysis

undertaken in Condemarin, where Judge Durham recognized that
the operation of a hospital by a governmental entity was not
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immune at common law.

Therefore, the legislature's attempt to

restrict recovery of damages against a governmental entity
operating a hospital violates the open courts provision of the
Utah Constitution.

The fact that prior to the adoption of the

Constitution the state had not actually engaged in that type
of activity is irrelevant.

2.

If the Governmental/Proprietary Distinction Were

Not Applicable to the State at Common Law, the Damage
Limitation Would Violate the Open Courts Provision Because
State Employees Are Immunized Without a Reasonably Equivalent
Substitute Remedy Being Provided.

In arguing that the damage limitation does not violate
the open courts provision, Appellants have entirely ignored an
important issue discussed by this Court in Condemarin.
Specifically, this court recognized that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act immunizes all individual health care providers at
the University Hospital from liability for their negligent
acts or omissions, thereby unquestionably restricting an
important right to recovery existing at common law.

See Van

Alstine, Governmental Tort Liability; A Decade of Change, 1966
U.Ill. L.F. 919, 966-67 (citing Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-10
(Supp 1965)).
In Berry ex rel Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), this Court stated:
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[S]ection 11 is satisfied if the law
provides an injured person an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of
law" for vindication of his constitutional
interest. The benefit provided by the substitute
must be substantially equal in value or other
benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing
essentially comparable substantive protection.
[Id. at 680].
The Act would only be constitutional in this regard if
it afforded the injured party a reasonably equivalent remedy.
As Judge Durham noted in Condemarin;
If we were prepared to sustain the recovery
limitation, we would be constrained to conclude
that this statutory provision fails the adequate
substitution test of Berry.
[775 P.2d at 361].
This Court in Condemarin only accepted the restriction on the
common law right to sue health care providers because of the
effective and reasonable alternative provided by the result of
the Condemarin decision which permits full recovery against
the hospital.
The Governmental Immunity Act, containing a damage
limitation that limits recovery against the state to
$250,000.00f obviously does not provide a reasonably
equivalent substitute remedy to injured parties for the right
to recover unlimited damages against doctors and other health
care providers.

Thus, the damage limitation violates the open

courts provision.
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B.

THE DAMAGE LIMITATION VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES,

Appellants argue that the damage limitation does not
violate the due process or equal protection clauses, despite
this Court's decision in Condemarin. for two reasons.

First,

Appellants argue that in Condemarin this Court mistakenly
applied a heightened scrutiny standard in determining the
constitutional issues because the Court mistakenly found that
the damage limitation violated the open courts provision of
the Utah Constitution and that the Court must apply a rational
basis standard in judging the constitutionality of the damage
limitation.

Second, Appellants contend that the 1987

Amendment avoided the constitutional problem with the damage
limitation by simply redefining a "governmental function" as
anything a governmental entity does.

These arguments should

be rejected by the Court.

1.

The Heightened Scrutiny Standard Was Properly

Utilized in Condemarin and Should Be Applied in This Case.

Hipwell has earlier demonstrated that this Court in
Condemarin correctly determined that the damage limitation
violated the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.
However, even if it were assumed for purposes of argument that
the open courts provision had not been violated, the Court
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properly utilized the heightened scrutiny standard in
analyzing the equal protection and due process issues and
properly determined that the damage limitation violates equal
protection and due process.
The Court did not base its utilization of the
heightened scrutiny standard in its equal protection and due
process analysis in Condemarin solely on the existence of a
common law right to sue the state for injuries inflicted at a
state-owned hospital.

Rather, the Court recognized that the

damage limitation severely restricted the important
substantive right of an individual to recover for personal
injuries.

The Court noted that the classifications created by

this statute interfered with the "fundamental principle of
American law that victims of wrongful or negligent acts should
be compensated to the extent that they have been harmed."
[775 P.2d at 354]. The Court observed:
The right to be [compensated] for personal
injuries is a substantial property right, not
only of monetary value, but in many cases
fundamental to the injured person's physical
well-being and ability to continue to live a
decent life.
[775 P.2d at 360].
Whether or not the damage limitation violated the open
courts provision of the Utah Constitution, the fact remains
that at the time the damage limitation was enacted by the
legislature, the citizens of this state had a right to full
recovery for injuries inflicted at a state-owned hospital.
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The damage limitation drastically restricted that right.

The

heightened scrutiny applied by this Court in Condemarin to the
classifications made by the legislature which interfered with
the important right of individuals to recover for personal
injuries was proper.

Therefore, this Court's analysis of the

equal protection and due process issues in Condemarin was
correct regardless of whether the damage limitation violated
the open courts provision.
Appellants cite Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake.
817 P.2d 816, 820-21 (Utah 1991), for the proposition that
because this case does not involve a fundamental right or a
suspect class, the Fourteenth Amendment only requires
application of a rational basis standard.

Greenwood, however,

addressed whether a city animal control ordinance that
discriminated against pit bulls violated the equal protection
clause.

Condemarin and the present case clearly involve a

substantially more important right than did Greenwood.

2.

The Damage Limitation Violates the Due Process and

Equal Protection Clauses Even If the Rational Basis Standard
is Employed.

At the Very Least. Issues of Fact Exist.

Even if this Court were to now employ a rational basis
standard in analyzing the constitutionality of the damage
limitation under the equal protection and due process clauses,
the damage limitation is unconstitutional.
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The only justification offered for the 1987 Amendment
either on the floor of the legislature or by Appellants is the
fiscal protection of the state treasury and the University
Hospital.

The 1987 Amendment, as with the predecessor

statute, shifted the entire burden of catastrophic injury onto
the shoulders of the catastrophically injured, those most in
need of financial assistance.
This Court noted in Condemarin that there was "no
factual showing in the legislative history or the trial court
that the recovery limitation is reasonably necessary for
preservation of the public treasury," yet alone a showing that
the limitation is "urgently and overwhelmingly necessary."
Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 363.

In fact, as this Court

recognized in Condemarin. the state treasury justification has
been roundly criticized:
As with the medical malpractice crisis,
those affected by the current dilemma in
municipal liability have identified the tort
system as the root of the problem. The two-fold
premise associated with this crisis is that
default lies in the tort system, and that
limitations on the rights of victims are
necessary in order to alleviate the problem.
Without more, acceptance of this premise requires
a leap of faith because the means-end connection
is essentially unsupported. The premises fails
because it is neither guaranteed nor likely that
limiting the rights of victims will produce the
benefits envisioned by the legislatures.
[775 P.2d at 362 n.10]; Note, Target Defendants and Tort Law
Reform:

A Perspective on Medical Malpractice and Municipal

Liability, 11 Vt.L.Rev. 535, 537, 542 (footnotes omitted).
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Nor is there any showing in this case that the amount
of the $250,000.00 damage limitation has a reasonable basis as
required by the cases.

See, e.g., Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 363

(calling on legislature to "settle upon and justify an
approximate figure demonstrated to be large enough to
compensate a majority of injuries (minor and serious) but not
so large as to threaten or ensure insolvency in response to
one judgment or a major catastrophe"); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 135 (N.D. 1978) ($300,000.00 damage cap held
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds as an
unreasonably low amount and as failing to promote the stated
legislative aims underlying its enactment).
Moreover, a constitutional and much less drastic
alternative was available and was, in fact, in use during the
period following Condemarin up until the 1991 amendments were
enacted.

Senator Barlow stated the following on the floor of

the Senate:
When the cap was removed by the underlying
Condemarin decision, the University of Utah
Medical Center was forced to buy commercial
insurance. In order to pay their premiums, which
totalled approximately $1 million a year, the
hospital increased patient fees by $40.00 per
person.
Floor Debate on Senate Bill 53, January 29-30, 1991 (Statement
of Sen. Barlow).

Senator Barlow precisely identified the

manner in which private hospitals budget for and pay large
malpractice judgments.

Moreover, nothing in the legislative

history even suggests that spreading the cost of malpractice
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insurance to University Hospital patients in any way
threatened the hospital or the state finances.

Even under a

rational basis standard, it is hardly rational or
constitutional to burden the catastrophically injured with the
costs of their misfortune when all patients of the University
Hospital can share the burden of indemnifying the Hospital and
the state treasury or when the cost of malpractice insurance
could be even further defrayed by passing the burden on to all
taxpayers.

This is especially true when the state legislature

has, at the same time, made a decision to strip individuals of
their absolute right to sue other individual health care
providers.
In the present case, Appellants made no showing in the
court below that the damage limitation was necessary to
preserve the public treasury.

As this Court recognized in

Condemarin, no such showing can be made.
issues of fact exist in this regard.

At the very least,

In this connection,

discovery in this case had only recently commenced when
Appellants filed their Motions for Summary Judgment and no
discovery had been conducted on the necessity for the damage
limitation.
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3.

The 1987 Amendment Did Not Cure the Constitutional

Problems With the Damage Limitation,

Appellants' argument that the 1987 Amendment avoided
the constitutional problems with the damage limitation found
in Condemarin by defining everything any government entity
does to be a governmental function is grounded upon the
fundamentally flawed assumptions that Condemarin only found
the statutory damage cap unconstitutional because the prior
statute did not define the operation of the University
Hospital as a governmental function and that the legislature
has plenary power to define "governmental function."
This argument is wrong because:

(a)

this Court in

Condemarin did not hold that the damage limitation was
unconstitutional only because the Governmental Immunity Act
purported to extend immunity beyond governmental entities
performing a governmental function.

Rather, the Court held

that other classifications in the statute rendered the damage
limitation as applied to the University Hospital
unconstitutional; and (b) the legislature cannot arbitrarily
define everything as a "governmental function" and even if it
could that would not affect what was considered to be a
"governmental function" at common law.
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(a)

Condemarin Did Not Strike Down the Damage

Limitation Only Because the Operation of a Hospital
Was Not Defined as a Governmental Function,

First, the Court was careful in Condemarin to analyze
the classification of governmental functions under § 63-303(2) separately from the constitutionality of the statutory
damage limit.1

The Court further observed that the state's

argument wrongly "collapse[d] the [governmental function]
classification issue into the recovery limits question" and
went on to state:
.The amounts contained in the recovery limits
statutes created yet another classification in
addition to [the governmental function
classification] summarized above. Not only are
victims of medical malpractice by government
personnel treated differently from victims of
private tortfeasors, but also there are
classifications within the victim group itself
. . . [T]hose whose economic losses exceeded the
statutory limit are precluded from even
recovering out-of-pocket costs resulting from
their injuries. The present case illustrates how
grave the disparity between the limit and actual
costs may be. . . . The recovery cap created the
distinction between victims of governmental
tortfeasors, depending on the severity of their
injuries: the mildly injured receive all; the
moderately injured, most; and the severely
injured, only a fraction or none of their
economic and/or non-economic damages.
[775 P.2d at 353].

1

The Condemarin court did not hold
§ 63-30-3
unconstitutional, but only § 63-30-34 as applied to the University
Hospital. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 352-54.
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The Court characterized the classification imposed by
the statutory damage limit as:
[a]n indirect classification of injured
victims which depends on whether their losses are
less than, equal to, or greater than the
statutory recovery cap and on whether those
losses are largely economic, largely pain and
suffering, or both.
[775 P.2d at 354].
Justice Stewart also viewed the damage limitation as a
violation of equal protection, stating:
The cap on liability imposed by § 63-30-34
creates at least two classes of hospital
patients. One class consists of patients
negligently injured at a governmentally owned
hospital who are entitled to limited recovery,
and another class is composed of patients
negligently injured at a private institution who
are entitled to full recovery. The critical
issue is whether denying the constitutional right
to some and not to others actually and
substantially protects the public treasury from
unreasonable depletion . . . . While there will
be some additional expenditures incurred by the
hospital's liability for full damages, there is
no reason to believe that the cost cannot be
covered as present liabilities.
[775 P.2d at 373].
Justice Durham described the due process violation in
Condemarin:
Having first expanded immunity and then
waived it, the legislature set out to accord the
victims of governmental tort-feasors the same
status as victims of private tort-feasors. With
the recovery cap, however, the legislature has in
effect retracted the waiver of immunity for the
seriously injured. The statute directly
prohibits those who are injured from recovering
compensation for proven injuries solely because
those injuries have been inflicted by government
health care providers.
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[775 P.2d at 361].
As Justice Zimmerman pointed outf "[t]he
constitution's drafters understood that the normal political
process would not always protect the common law rights of all
citizens to obtain remedies for injuries."

Id. at 367 (citing

Berry ex rel Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. Ill
(Utah 1985)).

P.2d 670, 677

Justice Zimmerman concluded:

[TJhere can be no question that the
legislation at issue, which severely restricts
the right of every citizen to recover even actual
out-of-pocket losses, both from a narrow category
of health care providers who are the actual
malefactors and from their governmental employer,
substantially infringes upon those interests
specifically protected by Article I, Section 11.
[775 P.2d at 368].

[Citation omitted].2

The legislature's purported redefinition of
"governmental function" in the 1987 Amendment did nothing to
cure these other classification problems identified in

2

The Supreme Courts of other states have struck down damage
limits related to governmental immunity statutes on similar equal
protection and due process grounds. See, e.g., Ryszkiewicz v. City
of New Britain, 479 A.2d 793 (1984) (statute struck under rational
basis of review); Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Auth. , 596 P. 2d 446
(1979) (statute struck under rational basis of review). Moreover,
the discriminatory classifications inherent in any medical
malpractice damage limitation have been the basis for a substantial
majority of courts to invalidate such limits, "usually on equal
protection grounds, but also occasionally under a due process
rubric." Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 361. See, e.g., Coburn ex rel.
Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F.Supp 983, 997 (D.Kan. 1985); Waggoner v.
Gibson, 647 F.Supp 1102, 1107 (N.D.Tex. 1986); Wright v. Central
Du Page Hosp. Ass'n., 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976); Kansas
Malpractice Victims v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988); Carson v.
Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (N.H. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125, 136 (N.D. 1978).
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Condemarin as violating the equal protection and due process
clauses.

The damage limitation remains unconstitutional.

(b)

The Legislature Could Not Constitutionally

Define Everything Any Government Entity Does As a
Governmental Function.

Second, the legislature cannot by fiat make everything
a governmental function and thereby extend the cloak of
governmental immunity to anything any governmental entity
does.

To take an easy case, if the state opened a public

restaurant in competition with private enterprise, it would be
foolish to argue that the restaurant was immune from liability
because it was engaged in a governmental function.
This Court has made it abundantly clear that the
standard for determining what is a governmental function is
whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique
nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency
or is essential to the core of governmental activity.

In

Condemarin, Justice Stewart recognized that the operation of
the University Hospital is not a governmental function in the
constitutional sense and that the legislature, by enacting a
statute, could not resolve the constitutional issue as to what
is and is not a governmental function.

In that regard,

Justice Stewart observed, "the central concept of the doctrine
[governmental immunity] is that immunity should exist for
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governmental activities that are integral to the governing
process so that they will not be jeopardized."
371].

[775 P.2d at

Justice Stewart then went on to address the

constitutionally required test for a governmental function:
Standiford formulated the following test for
determining whether governmental immunity
applies: "whether activity under consideration
is of such a unique nature that it can only be
performed by a governmental agency or that it is
essential to the core of governmental activity"
. . . by restricting somewhat the scope of
governmental immunity, the test implemented the
legislative intent to allow "more innocent
victims injured by tortious conduct on the part
of public entities access to the Courts for
redress" . . . beyond that, the test articulates
the core value protected by governmental immunity
- providing protection to the public treasury and
tax revenues against overwhelming losses so that
the essential functions of government will not be
imperiled. The test also identifies where the
constitutional right of a person to have a remedy
for personal injury begins under Article I, § 11
of the Utah Constitution as against a
governmental agency, and where the governmental
right to immunity from such lawsuits stops.
[775 P.2d at 371-72].
In that respect, Justice Stewart continued:
. . . In any event, the statute cannot resolve a
constitutional issue.
Thus the issue that emerges is whether the
Legislature ran afoul of Article I, § 24 of the
Declaration of Rights of the Utah Constitution by
limiting the liability of an institution owned by
government which performs non-governmental
activities.
[775 P.2d at 772] .
Appellants1 notion that the legislature can, by
convenience of a label, transform anything the government does
into a "governmental function" and thus clothe it with
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absolute immunity beyond any constitutional restriction is
directly at odds with this Courtfs decision in Hansen v. Salt
Lake County. 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990).

There the Court

interpreted the Utah Governmental Immunity Act to determine if
flood control was absolutely immune without exceptions.

In

doing so, the Court noted that the term
"governmental function" . . . is a term of art
long in use by the Courts to define those
activities of governmental entities to which
common law governmental immunity applied, as
opposed to "proprietary functions" of those
entities, to which immunity did not apply.
[794 P.2d at 842-43]. [Citations omitted].
In Hansen the Court noted, in reviewing the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, that:
There was (and is) no place in the structure
of the Act for a grant of absolute immunity. A
grant of absolute immunity should logically have
been placed in a separate section from the
general grant of qualified immunity (Section 6830-3) or, more likely, accomplished by excepting
the immunized activity from all of the waivers to
which it would otherwise be subject if placed in
the general granting section (Section 68-30-3).
[794 P.2d at 844].
The Court then went on to note that although in Rocky
Mountain Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459
(Utah 1989), the Court found flood activities were
governmental functions before the 1984 Amendment defined them
as such, it would not have been clear to the legislature that
the Court would so hold.

In that regard, the Court stated:

After our decision in Standiford and
Johnson, the legislature could reasonably have
doubted whether we would hold flood control
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activities to be uniquely governmental in nature
or essential to a core governmental activity.
[794 P.2d at 844].
That statement clearly reaffirms the standard in Standiford
for determination of the constitutional limits of governmental
immunity and further reaffirms the Court's role in ultimately
defining a "governmental activity" for constitutional
purposes.
In determining that the legislature intended to
subject the immunity to statutory waivers, the court in Hansen
stated:
Our cases have consistently held that if
alternative constructions of a statute are
possible, we should adopt the one that leads to a
minimum of constitutional conflict.
[794 P.2d at 845].
If, as the Appellants assert, the legislature can
immunize any activity by simply labeling it "governmental
function," then it made no sense for the Court to speak in
terms of minimizing "constitutional conflict."

In point of

fact, the Court went on to state:
Although we are not treating constitutional
claims here, other than one under Article I,
Section 22 (no taking of private property without
compensation), discussed below, we note that
there may be other constitutional problems with
the grant of absolute immunity for flood control
activities, including possible conflicts with
Article I, Section 7 (no deprivation of property
without due process), 11 (open courts provision),
18 (no impairment of obligation of contracts),
and 24 (uniform operation of the laws).
[794 P.2d at 845].
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Clearly this Court was stating unanimously there is not an
unlimited right to governmental immunity and that it must be
restricted to the traditional definition of "governmental
function" which contains within it the ambit of core
governmental functions.
In fact, it is clear that neither the legislature nor
Appellants themselves believed that the 1987 Amendment
purporting to make everything a governmental function
validated the statutory damage cap after Condemarin.

The

legislative history relating to the 1991 Amendment
demonstrates that the legislature itself believed Condemarin
constitutionally invalidated the expansion of governmental
immunity contained in the 1987 Amendment.
Immunity Act —

Act Expansion:

[Governmental

Hearing on S.B. 53, 48th

Legis. (1991) (taped transcript of floor debate)].

Indeed,

the legislature's 1991 Amendment of § 63-30-3(2) purporting to
define certain limited activities of the University Hospital
as governmental functions because they are "unique or
essential to the core of governmental activity" and the 1991
enactment of a new damage limitation in Utah Code Annotated §
63-30-34 flies in the face of any notion that the 1987
Amendment validated the old damage limitation.

Why would the

legislature enact a statute purporting to make certain
activities of the University Hospital a governmental function
because they are "unique and essential" if all the activities
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of the University Hospital had already been made a
governmental function by the 1987 Amendment?
When Appellants settled Mrs. Hipwell's injuries, they
did not do so in the belief that the 1987 Amendment validated
the damage limitation.

Rather, they understood that the

$250,000.00 damage limitation no longer applied after
Condemarin.

Appellants were right.3

The cases which Appellants cite for the proposition
that the legislature had the authority to reinstate
governmental immunity for state-owned hospitals by including
the activities of those hospitals within the definition of
governmental function, including Brown v. Wichita State
University, 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1976), stand only for the
proposition that after a court abrogates judicially imposed
governmental immunity the legislature has the constitutional
authority to reimpose governmental immunity provided that the
act does not invade any constitutional rights.

See, e.g..

Brown, 547 P.2d at 1021.

3

Even if it were assumed for argument that the 1987 Amendment
did validate the damage limitation, there is at least a question
of fact as to whether back in 1989, when Appellants settled Mrs.
Hipwell's claim for $250,000.00, that they acted reasonably in view
of the fact that neither the legal community nor the medical
community believed that there was any longer any damage limitation
in existence. In this regard, the University Hospital maintained
malpractice insurance in force until the 1991 amendments were
enacted. The evidence will demonstrate that when the settlement
was reached in 1989, no one believed that the damage limitation
applied to Mrs. Hipwell's injuries.
41

In this regard, Appellants cite Fritz v. Regents of
University of Colorado. 586 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1978), for the
proposition that a state has full authority to specify what
actions may be brought against the state and its subdivisions.
Fritz is hardly on point.

There, plaintiff was challenging,

as a violation of equal protection, the statutory requirement
that an injured party give written notice of the claim to the
state within ninety days after discovery of an injury.

The

court simply held that the notice requirement was a reasonable
condition to the right to maintain an action against the
state.
Finally, even if it is assumed for argument that the
legislature could constitutionally define everything that any
governmental entity does as a governmental function, what the
legislature did in 1987 could have no bearing on what was
considered to be a governmental function at common law when
the Utah constitution was adopted almost 100 years ago.

There

is absolutely no question but that under the common law the
operation of a hospital was considered to be a proprietary
function.

Consequently, the legislature's attempt in 198 7 to

limit recovery against a governmental entity for performance
of a proprietary function violated the open courts provision
of the Utah Constitution.
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CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully
submitted that Condemarin was correctly decided, that the 1987
Amendment changed nothing and that the damage limitation as
applied to the University Hospital is unconstitutional.

The

District Court's order denying summary judgment should be
affirmed.
DATED this £z>—day

of November, 1992.
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

Stephasl' B JJ Mitchel:
Attorneys for Appellees
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Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors.
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted

Appendix A

63-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of
an advisory body, student teachers certificated in accordance with
Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent
contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential
to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or
could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
j;hat would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent.
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property
damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement
or taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in
either public or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considerecTtcTbe governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities.

Appendix B

63-30-34L Limit of judgment against governmental entity
or employee,
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages for
personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $250,000 for one person in
any one occurrence, or $500,000 for two or more persons in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is characterized as governmental.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), if a judgment for property damage
against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity
has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000 in any one occurrence, the court
shall reduce the judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental.
(3) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages
awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged
private property without just compensation.

